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Fordham: Garnishment of Public Corporations

GARNISHMENT OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
JEFF

B. FORDrAme

The notion that garnishment of public corporations is against
public policy early took root in the minds of American judges.
The history of the subject is an interesting commentary on the
growth of our law. The policy objection, based principally on
the avoidance of inconvenience to public administration, has been
accorded wide judicial acceptance with only occasional reconsideration on the merits. Stare decisis and that characteristic, but for
the most part commendable, conservatism of bench and bar have
done their part to entrench the doctrine. Judicial revolt against
it, which has occurred largely in cases involving municipalities,
has made only modest and scattered inroads. The situation has
plainly called for legislative action. And legislation of varying
comprehensiveness is just what it has received in over half the
states of the Union.
The judicial conception of public policy proved too static. The
rapid expansion of governmental activity has made the assumption
of business and civil relations by public corporations a commonplace. The natural adjustment in the law is in the direction of
attaching the usual incidents of responsibility to such activities and
relations. In state after state legislation rendering the process of
garnishment available against public corporations, often against
the state itself, has cast the policy notion upon the juristic junk
heap.'
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
"See
n. 73, infra.
2

In the following instances statutes were enacted which at least modify

the judicial rule of immunity.

Sanders v. Steele, 124 Ala. 415, 26 So. 882
§ 8060, 8088-8091; Stermer v. Board of
Commissioners, 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 Pac. 839 (1894), Colo. Laws 1911, c.
143; Switzer v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 250, 19 Pac. 620 (1888); KAN.
REV. STAT. AN.
(1923) § 60-962 (salaries of public officers and employes
subject to garnishment), § 60-940 (municipalities exempt); School District
No. 4 of the Township of Marathon v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484 (1878), Miox.
CouP. L.ws (1915) § 13167; McDougal v. Board of Sup'rs. of Hennepin
(1889), ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928)

County, 4 Minn. 130 (1860),

MnDx. GEN. STAT.

(1923)

§ 9364; State v.

Everly, 12 Neb. 616, 12 N. W. 96 (1882), Neb. Laws 1925, c. '58; Owen v.
Terrell, 22 N. M. 373, 162 Pac. 171 (1916), N. M. STA.T. ANN. (1929) §
59-127; Clark v. Board of Com'rs., 62 Okla. 7, 161 Pac. 791 (1916), OKLA.
CouP. STAT. ANN. (Supp. Thornton, 1926) § 353-1; City of Memphis v.
Laski, 56 Tenn. 511 (1872), TENN. AxN. CODE (Shannon, Supp. 1926) §
3795a4; Van Cott v. Pratt, 11 Utah 209, 39 Pac. 827 (1895), UTAH CoMP:
LAws (1917) § 6754; State ez rel. Summerfield v. Tyler, 14 Wash. 495, 45
Pac. 31 (1896); WAsH. Coup. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 680-1, 680-2;
Buffham. v. City of Racine, 26 Wis. 449 (1870), Wis. STAT. (1929) § 304.21.
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The subject is of more than historical interest in West Virginia, where the judicial rule of immunity still obtains. That circumstance has evoked the present study. Possibly a broad investigation of the subject on the merits will prove useful for West
Virginia purposes.
The immediate inquiry is limited to the situation where the
public corporation is named as garnishee. Where the corporation
is principal debtor the problem is similar on principle and in fact
to that of execution against public corporations. There relief is
usually denied in order to prevent interference with property
devoted to public use. The considerations operative where the
corporation is garnishee are quite different as -will shortly appear.!
In the matter of enforcing satisfaction of public obligations, moreover, the law has supplied an adequate substitute for execution in
the form of mandamus.' Since garnishment ordinarily results in
a personal judgment only, the plaintiff may still be forced to resort
to mandamus to obtain satisfaction.
Time and again the fact that "garnishment is purely a creature of statute' has been given judicial utterance. That circumstance would appear to reduce the problem of he liability of public
corporations to the process to a matter of statutory construction.
Yet the history of the subject reveals that the judicial rule of
immunity has often been rested solely on grounds of public policy.'
The writer would not question judicial resort to considerations of
policy in many common law matters as to which the courts have
a law-making responsibility but where the field has been occupied
solely by legislation the notion that matters of policy are for the
legislature! certainly deserves notice.
If the statute subjects "persons" or "corporations" to the
The Montana court has distinguished the effect of execution and garnishment as follows: "By garnishment the waterworks, fire-engines, public buildings, and revenues of the corporation are not seized. The corporation is
simply required to hold, and finally pay over, a sum of money or property,
in which it has no interest, to one person rather than another. Its business
is not interrupted; its property is not touched; its functions are not deranged."
Waterbury v. Board of Commissioners of Deer Lodge County,
10 Mont. 515, 522, 26 Pac. 1002, 1004 (1891).
4See generally Fordham, AMethods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Oblgations of Public Corporations (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 28.
Brannon, J., in Ringold v. Suiter, 35 W. Va. 186, 188, 13 S. E. 46, 47

(1891).

'So it was in the much-cited case of Merwin v. Chicago, 45 Ill. 133 (1867).
See also State v. Eberly, supra n. 2.
7 The New Mexico court has affirmed this proposition in upholding a statute authorizing garnishment of the state as well as public corporations.
Stockard v. Hamilton, 25 N. M. 240, 180 Pac. 294 (1919).
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process does it apply to public corporations? The usual answer
is a rather emphatic "no". Since, as is true in West Virginia by
statute,' "person" will be construed to include "corporation" the
quest is one for the meaning of "corporation" in this connection.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, relying solely on
"the weight of authority", decided in WeWo Lumber Go. v. Carter
Bros.' that the term did not include public corporations.
The problem of construction has seldom been closely analyzed.
Courts not content to stand on authority alone have usually dragged
in the policy argument as an independent reason for finding the
statute inapplicable to public corporations and stopped at that."
The principle contention made in terms of statutory construction
has been the theory that public corporations are arms of the sovereign and as such are subject to suit only to the extent expressly
made so by statute." This generalization, if true," is too broad to
be useful here. Statutes commonly provide that municipalities,
counties or other public corporations may sue and be sued without
specifying the character of litigation contemplated.' Garnishment
The term "corporation" taken
is generally regarded as a "suit"'
literally without qualification certainly covers the public variety.
Public corporations, moreover, where civilly liable in contract,
quasi-contract or tort may be sued in like manner as any private
VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 2, art. 2, § 10(i).
78 W. Va. 11, 88 S. E. 1034 (1916).
See, for example, Duval County v. Charleston Lumber and Mfg. Co., 45
Fla. 256, 33 So. 531 (1903); Switzer v. City of Wellington, supra n. 2.
See the leading case of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Root,
8 Md. 95, 63 Am. Dec. 692 (1855).
" The theory is that the delegation to and exercise of governmental powers
by local agencies constitutes them arms of the state government. The extent to which they are such in practical effect varies greatly. The majority
of local officers owe no responsibility to the state government for their
ordinary conduct in office. Adding the fact of independent financial responsibility it is apparent that a city or county, for example, might rationally be treated separately from the state government for garnishment purposes. The writer believes, however, that even the state should be subject
to garnishment or some proceeding serving the purpose. That is now the
case in some jurisdictions by statute. E. g., ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §
8088; CAL. CODES AND GEN. LAWS (Deering, Supp. 1929) p. 2246; Neb. Laws
1925, c. 58; N. M. STATS. ANN. (1929) §§ 59-127; OKLA. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
(Supp. Thornton, 1926) § 353-1; ORE. LAws (Olson, 1920) § 258; S. D.
Comr. LAWS (1929) § 2453 (Garnishment against the state given the force
of an assignment of the claim and not a binding judgment against the
state); UTAH Comp. LAws (1917) § 6754; Wis. STAT. (1929) § 304.21; WYo.
ComP. STAT. ANN. (1920) §§ 6067, 6068.
'See W. VA. REv. CODS (1931) c. 7, art. 1, § 1 (as to counties).
14
WAPLES ON ATTACHnMENT AND GARNISHMENT (2d ed. 1895) § 470 e seq.
This point was relied upon in the dissenting opinion of Judge Carter in
Duval County v. Charleston Lumber and Mfg. Co., supra n. 10.
8W.
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party.' The objective effect of these considerations seems to
amount to this: a corporation which may "sue and be sued" may
be sued in any appropriate proceeding not otherwise expressly
barred and in this instance garnishment is entirely appropriate.
The familiar rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed lends support to this conclusion.
Legislative intention, should always be a guiding influence
in statutory interpretation." In the garnishment statute applicable
to "corporations" there may well be no specific intention as to
public corporations. The question of interpretation, however, cannot be escaped. If related statutes or the legislative history of the
subject do not suggest the answer the court may be forced to
determine, in effect, what the legislative intention would have been
had it been specifically fomulated. It will already have been
observed that the writer considers that a statute conferring capacity
"to sue and be sued" unaccompanied by limiting language may
supply the key to the difficulty. 7 Only after such possibilities are
exhausted is the court warranted in determining the issue of policy
and then only in the secondary sense of guessing at what the policy
of the legislature would have been.' The judicial practise, however,
has been to exercise a primary judgment in the matter.
The product of this primary judgment has more frequently
than otherwise been immunity. The cases to the contrary are for
the most part better thought out because the rule of immunity got
an early foothold and could not be summarily rejected in jurisdictions where the question subsequently arose.' It remains to consider the problem on the merits from the standpoint of policy. It
IzDILoN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 1610 et seq.
"See Horack, In the Maine of Legislative Intenon (1932) 38 W. VA. L.

Q. 119.

-7In Packard Phoenix Motor Co. v. American-La France Corp., 288 Pac.
1024, 1027 (Ariz. 1930), it was said: "The charter of the city of Phoenix
provides that (it may sue and be sued, .... in all actions and proceedings
whatsoever' ... . A garnishment proceeding certainly falls within the terms
of this charter provision." The city charter was broader in terms than the
usual statutory provision but under the view stated in the text that does
not warrant a difference in result.
" The judgment is a secondary one parallel to that which it is believed is
the province of the court in judicial review to determine constitutionality.
See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Burns Baking Co. v.
Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 517, 44 S. Ct. 412, 415 (1924).
10 The writer has not "counted noses"I but this is his reaction from an
extensive examination of cases, citation of which would not be fruitful. See
collection of cases (1880) 18 Am. Dec. 200; (1896) 51 Am. St. Rep. 114;
(1928) 56 A. L. R. 601, 602; (1929) 60 A. L. R. 823.
2DSee, for e.xample, the analysis of the problem in Waterbury v. Board of
Com'rs., supra n. 3; City of Laredo v. Nalld, 65 Tex. 359 (1886).
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will be useful to look first to the situation of municipalities since
all the arguments urged against their liability to garnishment and
sometimes others are used where other public corporations are involved.
Municipalities
1. The principal judicial objection to garnishment of municipalities has been public inconvenience. It is conceived that city
officers would be compelled to answer unlimited suits in which the
city had no interest thus throwing expense on its taxpayers and
damaging the public service by diverting the time and energies of
public officials from their duties.'
Is the city interested in the litigation ? Its interest is patent
where the claim sought to be enforced is a controversial one in fact
as between it and the principal debtor. It is as well that the matter
be settled in garnishment as in another litigation. If we suppose
a case where the principal debtor would not urge the claim attributed to him there is still an element of interest since there is
some likelihood, so long as it is outstanding, that the claim might
be pressed directly.
Interest is lacking where the corporation admits the indebtedness but so also is the element of inconvenience. If it is a case of
garnishment serving as an attachment in aid of the principal litigation and the city has money available to pay, it might avoid inconvenience by paying the fund into court and leaving the litigants to
settle their claims to it. The want of funds for payment would
simply mean that the city would be subjected to judgment.
Enforcement of the judgment might or might not cause embarassment but it would hardly be for the city to rely on its failure to
provide means for paying its debts.- Garnishment, or suggestion
as it' is called in West Virginia, in aid of execution on a judgment
21((.... in our opinion, the city should not be subjected to this species of
litigation, no matter what may be the character of its indebtedness. If we
hold it must answer in all these cases, and the exemption from liability be
allowed to depend in each case upon the character of the indebtedness, we
still leave it liable to a vast amount of litigation in which it has no interest,
and obliged to spend the money of the people and the time of its officials in
the management of matters wholly foreign to the object of its creation."
Merwin v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 133, 135 (1867).
2 Once a claim is established against a city the federal courts, in particular,
have little mercy on its public objects when it comes to protecting creditors.
City of Little Rock v. U. S. ex re?. Howard, 103 Fed. 418 (C. C. A. 8th,
1900); Rountree v. State ex roe. Georgia Bond and Mtg. Co., 135 So. 888
(Fla., 1931).
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against the principal debtor is even less objectionable because it
involves no independent litigation into which to drag the city.
The prospect of liability to garnishment burdening a city with
expense is slight indeed. In West Virginia the garnishee is liable
for costs only where upon trial of an issue as to whether he has
made full disclosure of indebtedness the verdict goes against him.'
If the proceeding is uncontested the city incurs no expense other
than administrative costs incident to the routine process of disbursement.
How serious, measured in West Virginia terms, would one
expect the inconvenience to be in a contested case? It cannot be
said that cities have suffered greatly in this behalf in ordinary
litigation. The burden of the case falls on the city attorney. The
pressure of garnishments is not likely to cause him to neglect other
things. He might require the attention of other officials in preparing the case and in appearing on the stand but seldom would the
distraction be for long. A great accretion of cases would prove
onerous but there is small prospect of such a situation and that for
practical reasons. The funded debt of a city is in negotiable form
and thus not effectually garnishable.' That substantially eliminates what is usually the largest item of indebtedness. Salaries of
officials would not be reached often because no public officer worth
his salt would be found in the sorry plight of having his salary
garnished if he could possibly avoid it. Minor officers and employes whose tenure is not fixed by law would for their own security,
if for no other reason, minimize attacks on their salaries by garnishors. A number of cases have involved efforts to garnish claims
under construction contracts with public corporations. So far as
laborers and materialmen are concerned it seems that the policy of
the law, which protects them by liens upon the finished product in
the ordinary case but which cannot be expressed in that way
against public property, ' is at least strong enough to neutralize
the inconvenience. With respect to general creditors of the contractor there unquestionably are quite a number of cases on record
= W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5, § 18; art. 7, § 28. See also c.
50, art. 9, § 19, as to justice of the peace practise.
24
Garnishment will not be allowed if at any time after service on the garnishment the instrument is negotiated to a holder in due course. See W. VA.
REv. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5, §§ 14, 15; art. 7, §§ 19, 25, 26.
= See Moss Iron 'orks v. County Court, 89 W. Va. 367, 109 S. E. 343
(1921). W. VA. REV. CODE .(1931) c. 38, art. 3, § 39, expressly exempts publie buildings from such liens and requires a bond of the contractor to afford
laborers, eto., protection.
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of at least attempted garnishment' but viewed in terms of a single
city the anticipated volume of litigation would be modest. Ordinarily, moreover, the city will have provided funds to meet the
purpose and could avoid inconvenience entirely simply by paying
the fund into court. Finally in the matter of supplies and equipment the cases would not be numerous in which the city's creditor
would be of a character requiring resort to garnishment. If he is
a non-resident there is substantial authority, at least in equity,
that the policy of protecting home creditors prevails in any event.'
These observations draw additional support from the fact that
none of the many state legislatures which have joined the chorus
against the judicial rule of immunity have changed their tune.'
Contentions other than inconvenience which have been used
to prop the rule of immunity are largely makeweights and do not
require extended notice.
2. A rather common suggestion is the idea that garnishment
would divert public funds from the objects to which they have been
appropriated . This is entirely specious in the ordinary case because
the city has gotten that for which it is paying and payment to the
garnishor discharges its obligation to the principal debtor. The
point has merit, however, where the city is in effect paying in
installments for that which is fully useful only as a whole, as in
the case of construction contracts. There the usual purpose of
paying as the work progresses is to provide the contractor with
funds to pay for what must go into the project. If payments are
intercepted by third parties the public interest may suffer due to
the inability of the contractor to pay his way. The effect is a
diversion of public funds from their proper object. The Wisconsin
statute subjecting public corporations to a proceeding which serves
the purpose of garnishment in aid of execution is expressly inapplicable to "moneys due a contractor engaged upon public work
This is no index, of course, to the number of unreported cases or to the
amount of litigation in states where the bars have been taken down.
See Boyd, Higgins and Goforth v. Malone, 142 Va. 690, 128 S. E. 259
(1925) ; Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Wells, 217 Fed. 294 (E. D. Pa. 1914)
(dictum). See also Pendleton v. Perkins, 49 Mo. 565 (1872) (in equity).
23In several instances statutes establishing immunity have given way under
enactments authorizing garnishment. E. g., OKLA. CoMP. STAT. ANN. (Bunn,
1921) § 353, (Supp. Thornton, 1926) § 353-1; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1929) (abrogating statute of 1862 which exempted public officers from garnishment).
The Iowa experience has been unique. In Wales v. City of Muscatine, 4 Ia.
302 (1855), the city was held subject to garnishment. In 1860 the Iowa
Legislature expressly forbade garnishment of "municipal or public corporations" and that is still the law of the state. IOWA CODE (1927) §12159.
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until all claims and expenses of performing such contract have been
paid. ' This distinction has been applied in some of the cases.'
3. It has been urged that to allow garnishment would often
mean that a city would be subjected to a judgment where it was not
indebted due to failure of its officers to contest the proceeding.'
The short answer is that city officers are responsible for their conduct in office and a court has no warrant to assume in advance that
they will not protect the city's interest. Such an argument would
operate to ban all litigation against the corporation. An occasional
dereliction of this sort would cost the city accordingly but the
amount mght be recouped by proceedings on the officer's bond'
Where the policy of immunity is followed the court makes no
distinction based on the character of function in performing which
a debt was incurred. Thus debts incurred in maintaining utility
services have been shielded from garnishment.' In one instance
the protection was accorded a debt owed by a city as trustee of a
charitable trust." Surely the case for immunity was never weaker
than at this point. The inconvenience notion is not persuasive as
to utility functions since the city is dealing in a business way
with the public and should be subject to the usual incidents of
responsibility.
Counties
Counties have been granted immunity almost universally in
of specific legislation.' The Colorado Court of Appeals
absence
the
went so far as to declare a statute subjecting "municipal corporations" to garnishment to be inapplicable to counties on the ground
CALN.CODE CIv. PROO. § 710a,
1929) p. 2247.
c"Under the Arkansas cases establishing "equitable garnishment" relief
is refused under these circumstances. City of Texarcana v. Offenhauser, 182
Ark. 201, 31 S. W. (2d) 140 (1930). See n. 61, infta. Cf. Leake v. Lacey,
95 Ga. 747, 22 S. E. 655 (1895) (denying garnishment though the construction project had been completed).
3 Born v. Williams, 81 Ga. 796, 7 S. E. 868 (1888).
"Municipal officers who "handle public funds or property" and all others
"of whom it shall be required" must give bond in West Virginia. W. VA.
REV. CODE (1931) c. 6, art. 2, § 11. This requirement is flexible enough to
permit adjustment to the situation if it turned out that municipal officers
were derelict in defending garnishment proceedings.
(water sys3Irilarry v. San Diego, 186 Cal. 535, 199 Pac. 1041 (1921)
tem); Laughlin v. Neveling, 1 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 370 (1885) (gas plant).
"Fairbanks Co. v. Kirk, 12 Pa. Sup'r. Ct. 210 (1889).
"See collection of cases (1929) 60 A. L. R. 823. Massachusetts is a
notable exception. Adams v. Tyler, 121 Mass. 380 (1876).

§ 304.21. See also
2WIs. STAT. (1929)
AND GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp.

CAL. CODES
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that they were quasi-corporations !" The more specific arguments
have been little more than a spelling out of the Colorado position.
It is insisted that a county is more clearly an arm of the state for
purposes of local administration than are cities; that a county's
powers and functions are much narrower; and that it is in general
less autonomous, lacking legislative power, for example. The last
two points are sound but it is not perceived that they are significant
here. That counties are subject to suit is definitely established by
statute. That they engage in more restricted functions than cities
should not render them the less responsive for debts incurred in
functions they do perform. Where the immunity notion has been
rejected as to cities it has been rejected broadly both as to its
functions similar to those of a county and as to its utility and other
services. The first point is not acceptable. In a state like West
Virginia where municipal corporations are completely the creatures
of the legislature, they are as much instrumentalities of the state
government for purposes of local administrations as counties, in
fact they are more so since they serve the purpose more fully. The
difference is simply that the two are useful in different phases of
public administration. Municipalities have more automony because
experience approves it for urban problems. Counties, then, as well
as cities, should be subject to garnishment.
Other Public Corporations
The rule of immunity has usually been extended to school districts and the various types of local improvement districts,' all
of which are created for highly specialized purposes. Nothing can
be said for immunity here that could not be said in the case of a
county. The objection of inconvenience is doubtless less significant
at this point since the attention of the district officers is not so
3Stermer v. Board of Com'rs., supra n. 2. Accord: Hoyt v. Paysee, 51
Nev. 174, 269 Pac. 607 (1928). This argument could be turned the other
way in a state like Georgia with a garnishment statute applying to all
corporations except "municipal corporations". GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) §
5302. If counties are not municipal corporations for this purpose in Georgia
the statute makes them garnishable but the Supreme Court of Georgia says
that counties are not garnishable. Dotterer v. Bowe, 84 Ga. 519, 11 S. E.
896 (1890).
nKein v. School Dist. of City of Carthage, 42 Mo. App. 460 (1890);
Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Br6s., supra n. 9.
2MeBain v. Rogers, 29 So. 91 (Miss., 1901) (levee district); Board of
Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Bodkin, 108 Tenn. 700, 69 S. W. 270
(1902) (levee district).
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constantly required by routine duties. Of the two West Virginia
cases on the general subject the first related to a school district and
the second to a municipality.'
Immunity was granted in both
without comment upon the type of public corporation involved on
the assumption, apparently, that the immunity extended to all
public corporations.
The West Virginia court was first confronted with the general
question in Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros.," where a board of
education of a school district was named garnishee in a proceeding
in aid of execution. The nature of the claim did not appear. The
board answered admitting indebtedness. The trial judge, on
motion of the principal debtor, quashed the suggestion on the
ground that the board was not garnishable. The Supreme Court
of Appeals in affirming stated: " ..... we are disposed to adopt
the rule which best accords with the weight of authority .....
"
and let the matter rest without independent analysis. Judge
Miller said:
"If uninfluenced by them (his brethren), this being a
case of first instance in this State, I would be inclined to
follow the opinion of the great text writers on the subject, as
being founded on the better reason. I see little merit in the
argument based on consideration of public inconvenience, etc.
The rules now adopted, I fear, are liable to be made the instruments of fraud and imposition by unconscionable contractors
of public buildings and other public works."
The Welch Lumber Company decision was followed in Leiter
v. The American La France Fire Engine Company' without dis-cussion of the merits. The court made no reference to the fact
that the garnishee, a city, was brought into the case by an order
of attachment before final judgment was rendered against the
principal debtor or to the fact that the principal debtor was a foreign corporation." The first circumstance tends to make the case
a stronger one for immunity but the second more than offsets it by
0 After an improvement such as a drainage system had been completed there
would remain the task of maintenance, which, however, would require only
intermittent application by the district officers.
,1Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros., supra n. 9 (school district) ; Leiter v.
American-La France Fire Engine Co., 86 W. Va. 599, 104 S. E. 56 (1920)

(municipality).

AtSupra n. 9.
1Supra n. 40.
"Service on the corporation was found to be defective so the primary
liability was not adjudicated. But that was no justification for ignoring the
policy of protecting home creditors and relying on the usual policy argument
against garnishment.
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reason of the strong policy favoring local creditors against local
assets of foreign debtors.
These cases represent the present state of West Virginia law
on the subject.
Salaries of Public Officers and Employees
"The author's view, where the question is left entirely
open by statute, is, that, on principle, a .municipal corporation
is exempt from liability of this character (garnishment) with
respect to its revenues, the salaries of its officers, and perhaps
also the wages of its employees, or payments to be made under
pending contracts for public works and the like, but that where
it owes an ordinary debt to a third person not in its service,
the mere inconvenience of having to answer as garnishee
furnishes no sufficient reason for withdrawing it from the
reach of the remedies which the law gives to creditors of
natural persons and of private corporations.""
Judge Dillon's distinction in favor of salaries of public
officers and employes finds some support in the cases.' The rational
basis for this position has been the supposed presence of an additional policy argument against garnishment of official salaries. It
has been urged that an officer's salary is calculated to give him
economic independence and thus freedom from private care to the
end that he may devote his time and energy unreservedly to the
public service;-garnishment of his salary might destroy that
independence to the detriment of the interests of the public.'
Reserving the merits for the moment, the argument must be
labelled inapplicable to employes who have no fixed tenure but are
hired to perform ministerial functions at the direction of those
higher up. Thus a particular policeman would hardly be considered an essential cog in the machinery. There may be instances
where the services of administrative officers or employes have
become quite unique but they are most exceptional in the lower
ranks. But to have to determine in every case whether the officer
or employe could easily be dispensed with, would be entirely impracticable. Would it not be more desirable, then, to subject all
in the class to garnishment and give creditors adequate remedies
"DILLON, MuinIAL CORPORATI NS (5th ed. 1911) § 249.
"See, for example, Packard-Phoenix Motor Co. v. American-La France
Corp., supra n. 17; City of Laredo v. Nalle, supra n. 20.
This thesis is elaborated in Sanger v. City of Waco, 15 Tex. Civ. App.
424, 40 S. W. 549 (1897); writ of error denied by Texas Supreme Court.
See also Heilbronner v. Posey, 103 Ky. 462, 45 S. W. 505 (1898); Bank of
Winnfield v. Brnnnfeld, 124 So. 628 (La. App. 1929).
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than to save for the public a few "unique" servants by giving
7
every petty employee the role of a spendthrift?'
Were it assumed for the moment that the elective and higher
ranking appointive officers of public corporations were never dispensable without injury to the public interest the argument for
immunity of salaries from garnishment would yet want persuasiveness. Few men worthy of important responsibilities would permit
themselves to be subjected to such a proceeding. That many would
avoid it by bending their energies to the exploitation of other
resources and thus to the neglect of public affairs is not demonstrable. Is it not just as safe to assume that officials who were
given no special protection from creditors would have a keener
sense of responsibility in public affairs than otherwise? Who can
say with assurance that the asserted policy of official independence
outweighs the policy, based on common honesty, which would subject one's resources to the satisfaction of his debts? In the
language of the Ohio Court of Appeals, "One would think that
it was in accordance with public policy to see that public officers
One might risk the further sug.'
did pay their debts .....
gestion that immunity would be undemocratic.
From the standpoint of West Virginia law the rule of liability
can fairly be tested only by experience. It is not for the courts
to make an exception in favor of public officers though the purpose
be to protect the public and not the officers themselves. Were the
rule of liability to have evil consequences legislative reconsideration
is always possible.
Immunity has been denied the earned salary of an officer whose
term had expired' 9 The policy notion did not apply. There is
some authority that the earned salary of one yet in office is garnishable." That is the more common situation where one would expect
a policy rationalization to be offered. The case of unearned salary
"The writer has strong sympathy for the views of John Chipman Gray
against spendthrift trusts. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) § 258 et seg. Their social implications apply very strongly here because public officers are before the public eye.
Cooper v. Schooley, 159 N. B. 727 (Ohio App. 1927). In Massachusetts
garnishment has been denied where compensation was statutory on the
ground that the process applied only to contract liability, express or implied.
Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 577 (1880). Salaries determined by local authorities are garnishable. Hooker v. McLennan, 236 Mass. 177, 127 N. E. 626
(1920).

"1Southwestern Savings Loan and Bldg. Ass'n. v. Awalt, 22 N. M. 607,
166 Pac. 1181, L. R. A. 1917F, 1117 (1917).
Cooper v. Schooley, supra n. 48. Contra: Sanger v. City of Waco, supra
n. 46.
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presents differences of degree but not such as to require different
treatment. It is not a proper case in which to invoke the policy
against assignment of official salaries.' The basis of that policy is
protection of the public service against direct and unnecessary embarrassment incident to voluntary assignment of unearned salary.
Deliberate bartering in such claims is unwholesome from the officer's standpoint as well. The factor of creditor protection is
not present. Of the statutes allowing garnishment not a few apply to unearned salaries.'
Judicial Limitations on the Rule of Immunity
1. Assuming that immunity will be granted where relied
upon by the garnishee corporation, may it be waived? Is it a
matter of defense or is it jurisdictional? Both suggestions have
received approbation.'
Since the protection is created for the
public and not the principal debtor the courts are naturally reluctant to permit him to hide behind it when the corporation does
not elect to do so. The Mvichigan court, on the other hand, has
made the unsound ruling that a school district could not waive the
immunity as to a teacher's salary without his consent.' The West
Virginia position has been that the immunity cannot be waived. '
Once the rule of immunity is embraced the conclusion against
waiver seems inescapable. Garnishment being a statutory process
the expanse of a court's jurisdiction in the matter depends upon
MA statute subjecting earned salary of public officers to garnishment has
been construed not to abrogate the rule that the unearned salary of a public
officer may not be assigned. Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 51
Utah 153, 169 Pac. 170 (1917). The West Virginia statute does not apply
to debts arising after the time answer was filed. Ringold v. Suitor, supra
11.55.

2E. g., N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT §§ 684, 685; WIs. STAT (1929) § 304.21.
6 ' Waiver allowed: Tone v. Shankland, 110 Ia. 525, 81 N. W. 789 (1910);
Clapp v. Walker and Davis, 25 Ia. 315 (1868) (so held though immunity
established by statute); Dollar v. Allen West Com1n. Co., 78 Miss. 274, 28
So. 876 (1900); Dollman v. Moore, 70 Miss. 262, 12 So. 23 (1892); Baird
v. Rogers, 95 Tenn. 492, 32 S. W. 630 (1895) (garnishment of officer's salary claim after term of service; dictum that defense could not be waived
while he was in office).
No waiver: Porter and Blair Hdw. Co. v. Perdue, 105 Ala. 293, 16 So. 713
(1894); Vaughn v. Condon, 52 Cal. App. 713, 195 Pac. 545 (1921); Born v.
Williams, 81 Ga. 796, 7 S. E. 868 (1888); First National Bk. v. City of
Ottwa, 43 Kan. 294, 23 Pac. 485 (1890); School Dist. v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484
(1878); Morgan v. City of Beaumont, 157 S. W. 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
(dictum, immunity established by city charter); Van Cott v. Pratt, 11 Utah
209, 39 Pac. 827 (1895); Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros., 78 W. Va. 11,
88 S.E. 1034 (1916).
r'School Dist. v. Gage, sup'ra n. 53.
'Welch Lumber Co. v. Carter Bros., supra n. 53; Leiter v. Piro Engine
Co., supra n. 40 (dictum).
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statute. The rule of immunity embodies the assumption that the
statute does not apply to public corporations. It logically follows
that the parties cannot by their consent confer jurisdiction. On
the merits, moreover, were the policy rationale of the immunity
sound it would not be wise to permit public officers to raise or
lower the shield at their caprice. They would be tempted to discriminate between creditors. To leave the application of the policy
to administrative discretion is an admission of its weakness,' or at
least that it is not inflexible.
2. Equitable garnishment.
The advantages of garnishment have been in part saved to
creditors in Arkansas, where the legal rule of immunity is followed,
by the resourcefulness of equity. Arkansas has contributed
"equitable garnishment" to our jurisprudence. M1issouri has
embraced the device in the teeth of a statute forbidding garnishment of public corporationsF but at least four states and the District of Columbia have definitely rejected it.' "Equitable garnishment" is a proceeding in the form of a creditor's bill in which the
plaintiff must plead and establish the insolvency of the principal
debtor and the inadequacy' of legal processes. A public corporation indebted to the principal debtor is simply joined as a defendant and subjected to a personal decree requiring payIf the claim is one under a contract
ment to the plaintiff.'
for construction of public works the plaintiff must further estab14This is particularly true where the courts allow waiver of a statutory
immunity. See Tone v. Shankland and Clapp v. Walker, both &upra n. 53.
Cf. Vaughn v. Condon, supra n. 53.
fDe Field v. Harding Dredge Co., 180 Mo. App. 563, 167 S. W. 593 (1914);
Pendleton v. Perkins, 49 Mo. 565 (1872).
M cConnell v. Floyd Co., 164 Ga. 177, 137 S. E. 919 (1927); Dow v.
Irwin, 21 N. M. 576, 157 Pac. 490 (1915) ; Clark v. Bd. of Com'rs., 62 Okla.
7, 161 Pac. 791 (1916); Parsons v. McGavock, 2 Tenn. Ch. 581 (1875);
Columbia Brick Co. v. D. C., I App. D. C. 351 (1893). The West Virginia
court has intimated that it would not allow equitable garnishment. Rothwell v. Brice, 94 W. Va. 466, 471, 119 S. E. 293 (1923). In New Mexico,
Oklahoma and Tennessee statutes now expressly permit garnishment. See
n. 2, supra.
"' In Missouri legal processes need not first be exhausted if complainant
can show that that course would be futile. Pendleton v. Perkins, supra n. 57.
Improvement District v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 181 Ark. 288, 25 S.
"harf
W. (2d) 425 (1930); Plummer v. School Dist., 90 Ark. 236, 118 S. W. 1011
(1909). See also SL0 , Tim LAw OP IMPROVEENT DiSRICTS IN AMNSAS
(1928) §§ 28 - 31.
Cf. First National Bk. v. Mays, 175 Ark. 542, 299 S. W. 1002 (1927)
(equitable garnishment of compensation county owed sheriff for feeding
prisoners denied because compensation subject to settlement of sheriff's accounts and garnishment might embarrass that settlement).
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lish that the work has been completed.' The device is particularly
effective where the principal debtor is a non-resident.
The explanation of this equitable creation is probably that
it is in part a recognition of the unsoundness of the immunity rule
and certainly in larger part an appreciation of other policies which
at least neutralize the policy against inconvenience to the public
service. Equity relies on the general policy underlying creditors'
bills, that a creditor shall not go empty-handed if equity can avoid
it,' and in an appropriate case on the policy favoring domestic
creditors against foreign debtors.'
Means of Circumventing Immunity
Statutory proceedings in aid of execution go far in West
Virginia toward reaching intangible assets." Choses in action which
are disclosed are required to be assigned to the levying officer
under pain of an attachment of the body of the debtor.' The
court to which the writ is returnable is required to order such steps
to enforce payment as it deems best. Thus the execution creditor
may -without even resorting to garnishment sometimes enforce
claims of the principal debtor which could not be sold under execution. Since the officer by assignment of the claim becomes the legal
owner, for purposes of collection, he would be in as favorable a
position as the assignor to enforce a claim against a public corporation. Thus the policy argument would not apply.
This possible method of circumventing the immunity rule in
West Virginia is no reason for not overthrowing it. Garnishment is
useful both before and after judgment. It is more efficient,-never
depending upon an assignment by the principal debtor or upon
the ingenuity of the court in devising a method of enforcing the
assigned claim. It is desirable, moreover, to have a choice of
remedies.
One further alternative deserves notice. In a case otherwise
satisfying the requirements of a creditor's bill claims against public
corporations may be reached and sold in equity. The policy notion
City of Texarcana v. Offenhauser, smpra n. 30; Sloan, Zoo. cit, .upra n.
60.

2The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has insisted that the proceeding
in equity is just as opposed to the policy against inconvenience as legal garnishment. Clark v. Bd. of Com'rs., supra n. 58.
See citation of authorities, supra n. 27.
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 38, art. 5.

-Ibid., §§ 4, 5.
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has no bearing since the corporation is not a party.' A decree
appointing a receiver to take an assignment of a claim against a
city and collect or adjust it has been upheld.' This device approaches the West Virginia statutory scheme just described. A
sale in equity would not perform the function of garnishment since
a forced sale is not likely to be as fruitful as direct payment.
Garnishment of Property or Funds of Debtors in the Hands
of Officers of Public Corporations
Suppose funds have been paid over to a county officer for
purposes of redeeming land from a tax sale. May a creditor
of the holder of the tax certificate garnish the fund? A negative
answer was given in an Illinois case.' The problem may be presented, of course, with respect to any public officer such as a clerk
of court, sheriff or constable who is likely to have control of money
or property of private parties, in his official capacity.' A fiscal
officer with public funds in his custody is not, of course, in this
category." If the particular officer is a court officer and the money
or property is still in custodia legis pending final order it is not
garnishable because the court with established jurisdiction will not
In the absence of that objection the courts
brook interference.'
favoring immunity have been wont to rest on the inconvenience
notion. It has no more virtue here, however, than at other points
and a growing list of statutes expressly subjecting public officers
to garnishment in this type of case have been enacted.'
Legislation
A total of twenty-nine states now have express enactments
rendering garnishment available against public corporations or
1'Riggin v. Hilliard, 56 Ark. 476, 20 S. W. 402 (1892).
0,Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452 (1876).
Smith v. Finlen, 23111. App. 156 (1887).
Connolly v. Thurber-Whyland Co., 92 Ga. 651, 18 S. E. 1004 (1893);
Rohan and Son Boiler Works Co. v. Young, 190 Mo. App. 649, 176 S. W.

295 (1915).

"In this situation garnishment of the officer is in effect garnishment of
the corporation. Triebel v. Colburn, 64 Ill. 376 (1872).
uAfter decree directing payment of a fund in the hands of a commissioner garnishment will be permitted since the reason for denying it has ceased.
Boylan v. Hines, 62 W. Va. 486, 59 S. E. 503 (1907).
7-ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 8060; IDAHO COMP. STAT. (1919) § 6799;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1926) § 1004; MONT. Buy. CODE (Choate, 1921)
§ 9294; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 11829; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929)
§ 59-127; UTAH ComP. LAws (1917) § 6754; WYo. COMP. STAT. (1920) §
6127. The statutes of several other states on the general subject are broad
enough to allow garnishment in this type of case. Massachusetts alone expressly grants immunity. MASS. (FEN. LAw. (1921) e. 32, § 37.
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their officers. These statutes vary greatly, of course, both in form
of expression and extent of application. The Wyoming statute at
the one extreme is quite comprehensive while that of Maryland
occupies the other by giving the remedy to the state alone. Eight
'
states have by statute granted at least partial immunity. None of
the immunity statutes, however, were enacted recently." Investigation has disclosed no instance of the repeal of a statute rendering
the process available. The trend has developed into a movement
in the opposite direction. In no less than twelve states legislation
has served to abrogate a judicially established rule of inmuity
The "weight of legislative authority" is now definitely against
the West Virginia position, a circumstance not to be overlooked
when one recalls the basis upon which that position was assumed.
Viewed solely upon the merits, however, West Virginia might well
get in step. That her public corporations have fallen upon evil
days during the current stringency is not an answer since garnishment would not increase the financial burden. Nearly two years
intervene, moreover, before the next regular session of the Legislature.
The simplest phase of the subject from a legislative standpoint
is garnishment of property or funds of debtors in the hands of
public officers. Garnishment should be fully and directly extended
to the case. West Virginia might draw upon the statutes of sister
Clarity would be served by
states for guidance in the matter.'
" In addition to the statutes cited in notes 2, 29 and 72 supra, see the following: Ariz. Stat. 1929, c. 50; MAss. Gm'T. LAws (1921) c. 223, § 28 (similar to Vermont provision); Nrv. REv. LAws (1912) § 5154; N. J. CoMP.
STAT. (First Supp. 1918) p. 587, N. J. Pub. Laws 1915, p. 471; N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT §§ 684, 685; N. D. CoUP. LAWS (1913) § 7567; ORE. LAWS (Olson
1920) § 258; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 2453; VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §
1952 (assumes that garnishment lies by providing a method for summoning
public corporations); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§ 6560, 6561. MD.
CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1924) (authorizes garnishment of counties and the city
of Baltimore at suit of the state with respect to property or money owed
debtors of the state). The Maine statute after an amendment striking out
a clause exempting public corporations has been held applicable to them.
Clark v. Clark, 62 Me. 255 (1874).
74 GA. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 5302; IDAHO COUP. STAT. (1919) § 6799;
IOWA CODE (1927) § 12159; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 60-940; LA.
Civ. CODE art. 1992, LA. REV. CODE OF POAO. (Marr, 1927) art. 647; MASS.
GEN. LAws (1921) c. 32, § 37. See n. 72, .supra; Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) §
1848; TEx. COmPLE.TE STAT. (Vernon, 1928) art. 1175-5 (authorizing home
rule cities to immunize themselves).
5On the other hand some are quite old. B. g., IOwA CODE (1927) § 12159,
dating from 1860.
7 See n. 2, supra.
' See references to statutes, supra n. 72. The simple Alabama statute,
though inadequate, would afford a starting point:
SIMoney in hands of an attorney at law, sheriff, or other officer, may
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expressly negativing any application of the statute to public funds
Provision should be made also
in the custody of financial officers.
for payment into court to abide the result of litigation in which the
fund is involved if the garnishee be a court officer.
Most of the statutes providing expressly for garnishment of
salary or other claims against public corporations simply extend
the ordinary process to the new field." California and Wisconsin,
however, substitute a special type of proceeding calculated to minimize inconvenience to the corporation. One who has obtained a
judgment in a court of the state against a debtor to whom a public
corporation is indebted is authorized to file a transcript of his judgment with the corporate auditor, or other officer performing auditing functions, whereupon the officer must issue his warrant for or
pay so much of the amount owing the principal debtor as will
satisfy the judgment. 0 The Wisconsin statute goes further. All
sums coming due after filing of the transcript are required to be
applied to the judgment till it is paid in full.'
Both the California and Wisconsin statutes make proper exception for incomplete public construction contracts." Three inadequacies of both should be-noticed in contemplation of more complete enactment for West Virginia. First they serve only the function of garnishment in aid of execution and not the function of atbe garnished; and in the case of officers of the court, the money must
be paid into the court, to abide the result of the suit, unless the court
otherwise direct."
ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 8060.
78The provision is not essential. Thus the Ohio act has been declared inapplicable to financial officers. Bazzoli v. Larson, 178 N. E. 331 (Ohio App.
1931).
"'See references to statutes, supra n. 73.
' See n. 29, supra. It is desirable to make the language of the statute explicit to avoid a narrow construction. See the unwarrantably narrow construction given the California statute in Weiser v. Payne, 110 Cal. App. 378,
294 Pac. 407 (1930). See also Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. City of Andalusia,
218 Ala. 511, 114 So. 236 (1928); Troy Laundry Co. v. City of Denver, 11
Colo. App. 368, 53 Pae. 256 (1898).
The New York scheme is similar but the statute is too restricted in application. It applies only to salaries and wages and affects only sums coming due after service of execution. N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT. §§ 684, 685.
The Washington statute is unique. It reads in part:
"'No regular judgment in garnishment shall be entered against any
municipal corporation, but the judge of the superior court or justice of
the peace shall by written order command the auditing officer, or body
of such municipal corporation to audit and pay to the judgment creditor
the amount due from the garnishee to the principal defendant, not exceeding the amount of the judgment in the main action, whereupon the
same shall be paid by the garnishee ......
WAsH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 680-2.
82See n. 29, su"ra.
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tachment pending the principal controversy. That gap could be filled by specifically providing that from the time of service of notice
of the pending proceeding on the corporation it should withhold
payment till final determination of the case. It would be necessary
to bring the corporation into the suit only where it contested the
claim and there the issue could be tried as in garnishment. That
takes care of the second deficiency of the California and Wisconsin
statutes. For the case of an uncontested claim it would be desirable
to require a bond of the plaintiff to indemnify the corporation from
liabilities to third persons arising from withholding the fund.
A third bald spot is the lack of specific refernee to the situation where the corporation is unable to pay an established debt,
a not uncommon affair these days. Insofar as the corporation in a
givenicase had authority to issue a "no fund" warrant that might
be required of it. For the case where the principal debtor had a
warrant for the sum due him it would be necessary to stipulate
that the issuance of a further warrant under the statute would invalidate it to the extent of the amount of the new warrant. The
instance of want of power to issue "no fund" warrants would cause
no difficulty where the claim had been contested since a successful
plaintiff would have a personal judgment. That a claim was uncontested might be treated as a sufficient liquidation of the claim
to ground resort to mandamus to compel satisfaction.
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